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this r i m r e h  h u  concentrated mainly on soureea 
published by tha Soviat state. After an initial examination 
of aaeondary matariala covering a ranga of interpretations, 
focua shifts to thasa Soviat publications, including military 
theoretical journals and official Communist Party documents 
and records. Many of tha translations of these primary 
Soviat sources are original, and tha author feels certain 
this practice lands tha thesis credibility. Thanks go to 
Professor Roger E. Kanet for his guidance and support.
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h distueeien of m m  llil
** doctrine test be praeadi1 by m Ifitiiiiftt it • tf#itt ',
attitudes toward* tilt concept of way. ha a seeialidt
•*•«. ti» lwi«t fltitn pereeiwte ItMU, as Util «* tilt
r«t of tilt world, ia a tatty fundaatatally different
f*tt tty ota. Soviet thinking ia anttcra of wit tad ft*—
enpraeaes this difftrtatt tttt teapletely than it a y  other
•bin*- way for tilt Soviets it «a expression of elatt con-
flict. It ia a eoafliet iaposed upon tht popular aaaatt
by tilt tear fto la It. intending tilt notion to rtlatioat
itt» etntee, wur ia tht expreasien of a conflict httwtta
i M1A Of# AfeAfeft m A A aim 11 11 It ait fnn &*mmmAtmrn-w P^PrPP^PRr-¥WRiW^ ’^
to thtobjective lawe of history, the iaparialltt nation 
by natuya will initiate thit eoafliet aftlaat the teeialist 
oatp with tht purport of destroying it. Itoauat of thtat 
objtotivt lawt of history, tht •oeiallat state la incapable 
of initiating s way against the imperialist (capitalist) 
nations. This elsss-orisntod natuye of way, as the fevlots
see it, is at the hub of the political iaportanes which 
they attaoh to tht ooncept of araed conflict. It follows 
that, because of the historically predttertined destiny 
of the socialist nations, a war between Istperlaiiatlo 
capatalisai and socialist is of enoraous political iapor- 
tanoet Because of the interrelation between polities and 
way, socially* victory is inevitable by the laws of history
* : ' ,r:- ^ J r . * : , ‘ ; ‘X'
ffPW IK |Piii«9ii OiKIinf VK wmmt wmwm lit
regarding iapnriaUat aggression and ultimata socialist
tetete jut# JMK te^itlLtete tetete teilt
political beliefs w o n  white tte Soviet reglm lend* its
legitineoy.
Naay observers in ate test bate refuted tea appli­
cability of th* fundamental Clauaewlttlan dictua la tte 
nuclear age. Baeauaa of tte exponential inoraaaa fa tte 
destructive capabilities af weaponry, a nuclear tec oaa 
no loafor te interpreted to be a continuation of polities 
by othftr (yiolmtl amyi. xt i§ i i M H i i  i ^ l  a anfibMur 
weapon is no rational inetrunant of policy. In light of 
the pervasive influanoa of tte MM) theory in the Hoot, 
self-annihilation could not possibly be considered "politic#, 
ratter, it ia insanity. Thus, «any in tte teat hate tandad 
to view aueiear war as divoroed froa polities. Per the 
Soviets, however, technology and it# developments aiaah 
as nuclear weapons do not change the essential polities! 
content of war. tegardlaos of doatruotloa, war is still 
tea polities! expression of oonflict between iaporialiaa 
and aooialiaa. The Soviet approach to the eoner; ‘ of war 
dote, hewever, dlatingulah tetwaan war aa a continuation 
of politioo by violent naans and war aa a feasible instru­
ment of policy. According to Robert L. Arnett, many waatarn 
analysts, aueh as Riehard Pipes, have felite to distinguish
Ijv:- '^ v' . " " vv.,. ../••*'•'• ' $ ' ■ .>
ipciMta* it u  t baaie tenet of mg*Lu**umixkim m m  hei** 
m  thplaia their theery of tie siitst# astute oat esoiam 
•t wer."* tut, Arnett argute, sevlet stataeents foe* both 
*Jw civilian oaf military scetorc explicitly achnowladga 
that the inltiatiea of nuclear war it not a practical 
lnstrumant of policy. A survey of available aouroea in*
eluding
and aubataatiatea thia.
Soviet reeegaitlea that tbo initiation of nuclear
hootiiity is of dubious c a l m  in taro* of an iaatruuoat 
of policy is sigalfioaat. they recoyniae the deatrUetive 
oapabilltleo in the nuclear agar tibia impliaa further 
reeoyaition that both parties to a nuclear conflict would 
suffer extensive losses. Yet their assertions eoncerniny 
the inevitable political oontent in any war provides the • 
observer with helpful ineiyht into the manner in which 
the Soviets approach the concept of war in general. War 
is politics. Polities for the Soviets is, in the realm of 
war, the pitting til one state against another, with the 
class orientation of the •ovist state determining the 
outcome, according to objective laws of historyi
In new war, if it should ho aiiswmd to 
, victory will be with tho couetries 
world eeeleliet system which are
ftaoittr coupons have transforeed the Mturt of 
* * m  wmniK, tat the political M M M t  of I M I  eoafllct 
it fo* tut Soviet Onion ever pretest. the political eontent 
of m  h u  to i luft d o o m  auifoitod i too if in tho 
political oontont of Soviet strategic doctrine. Soviet 
strategic doctrine sneoepassee o hierarchy of nrssfionsnf 
of the Soviet approach to treed conflict. Strategy ie 
subordinated to doctrinal actual procedural olecoats of 
strategy are determined by the political ragtHrteants of 
that doctrine, strategy, therefore, defines tactice end 
alii tar y art. n c M g a t t  the following analysis of tie 
structure end tweeUinu o« Soviet strategic doctrine, its 
political contest ««.! hen— s evident. Note that the 
political retirement* for Soviet strategic policy are
VtfViv* ^^ PP»y* pp|P|P
maatarn scrutiny since M m  lit# &4#'* HIM« tho iwaHnsn
iw^Riiv jr w^jp ^^^^TfJpjSWPr W^PPPPH
•Xplotion. Witt tho Soviet leadership tfcMIl Moot smtltst 
war la of fundamental la^MtaoM la terms «( M i  etratagia
policies of ilia united Im i m  aa wall aa ottos* mmattont
powers. Concorn exists over whether aha Soviet Onion
adheres to an lntarpratatlon of the strategic nuclear 
faoo-off which la similar to woattrn views. am M *  Soviets 
aocapt a policy of detarremma and, if m , do M a y  perceive 
dafearranca in tho M a w  light aa M i  MMrletft*? If not,
i^ it eofiititutfti #hM Sovltfc AAi^ tttiaA atrat itwiw^ P^PPP^WP^PJP^P^fcSpM* PS; PBwwPPBPwB^pBff^m.
datarranca? in addressing M o m  questions, ooat observers 
agree that tho boat way to approach tho Im h o  la with an 
examination of Soviot atrataqic dootrlna.
«»o pitfall* which plaqua any eumminatloa of Soviot 
strategic dootrlna ara numerous . ha aeeurata estimate of 
ita components ia poaaibla only through an analysis of 
asserted litaratura mi tha subject, examination of pubilo 
policy statements by individuals coatprisiri tha Soviot 
laadarchlp, and, finally, a aurvay of aetual strategic 
capabilities of tho Soviot nuoloar tracoal* *uoh tasks 
ar* by no moans elaar out. Moot discussions of atratagic 
policy ara found in soviot miliamry-theofftieal journals,
2although sevaral hooka published by Soviet strategic theorists 
are considered authorities by nest western analysts. Soviet 
public policy statements aimed at western audiences are 
perpetually under suspicion; such statements are often 
times misleading. The Soviets have both overestimated 
and underestimated their own st ategic capability since 
acquiring a nuclear arsenal.
Complication and confusion also arises when at­
tempts are made to estimate the importance and influence 
of Soviet strategic doctrine in actual Soviet decision 
making. Once we have identified the actual content of 
doctrine, evidence must be provided to prove that strategic 
policy decisions actually conform to, and arise from,
Soviet strategic doctrine. The question must be asked;
Does strategic doctrine beget strategic policy? If the 
answer is a qualified "yes," which elements of doctrine 
carry official sanction, and which do not? Furthermore, 
what purposes might Soviet strategic doctrine serve aside 
from the primary tasks of guiding weapons procurement and 
outlining operating procedures? Evidence indicates that 
Soviet strategic doctrine does indeed serve other purposes; 
this will become clearer as specific tenets of the doctrine 
are identified and explained. As doctrinal content is 
revealed, its implications on Soviet defense policy will 
be discussed. Finally, Soviet strategic doctrine will be 
paralleled with cosqponents of its Western counterpart.
3Station 1: Doctrinal Development
The most useful approach in axamining tha content 
of Soviet strategic doctrine is to survey its historical 
development, identifying tenets as they are incorporated 
into the abstract set of notions which comprises doctrine. 
Perhaps the most identifiable factor fueling the evolution 
of Soviet strategic doctrine is weapons technology, 
although a score of influences have played a role in doc­
trinal development throughout its history. Initial 
attention will be paid to the final years of ths Stalin 
regime, for, although "Stalinist military science" has 
undergone substantial revision, its ideological and 
nationalistic underpinnings continue to color Soviet 
strategic doctrine in the nuclear age.
The stifling of debate end initletive which 
characterised the Stalinist regime is perhaps most evident 
in the development of Soviet military doetrine in the 
years iasMdiately following the Second NorId War. Stalin's 
absolute preeminence within the military hierarchy facili­
tated his own monopoly in determining and outlining the 
theoretical foundations of military doctrine and the 
strategy, tactics and operational art which are subordinated 
to it. Stalinist military doctrine was in force throughout 
the post wwix years and even continued several mciilHi after 
his death. It was a nationalistic, ideology-serving set 
of guiding principles outlined in the "Permanently Operating
4Factors” (POF's). Stalin referred to tha POF's in a 
February address to tha Soviet nation after tha 1942 
German invasion. The POF's consisted of *. . . tha stability 
of tha rear, the morale of tha troops, tha quantity and 
quality of divisions, the armaments of the army, and tha 
organisational ability of tha command personnel of tha 
army."4
Tha circumstances in which Stalin codified and 
announced his POF's are important in understanding tenets 
of Soviet military doctrine distinctly unique to the 
Soviet state, and the fundamental influence of Narxlst- 
Leniniat ideology on Soviet military thinking. Soviet 
military response to the surprise German invasion earns 
only after weeks of vacillation and indecision. It was 
clear that the German forces had gained a significant 
strategic advantage by utilising the element of surprise 
in their attack. To concede that the German army, fascist 
and imperialist, had gained a quick and substantial ad­
vantage over a state with a superior social system and 
consequently a superior military capability was impossible. 
Such a concession mould not only amount to an admittance 
of a lack of Soviet preparation and foresight, but would 
also pose a substantiai threat to the viability of several 
ideological tenets. Stalin's solution was to downplay 
drastioaliy the significance and value of surprise in 
warfare, deeming it a "transitory factor;" the PGP's were 
to determine the true outcome of a conflict. The defeat
? 7 V ' 7 ' . >
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of the German army by tha Soviata in 1945 rainforcad 
Stalin's doctrine. That tha rat's constituted tha mainstay 
of Soviet military dootrina until 1954 in spita of tha 
technological "revolution in military affairs" facilitatad 
by nuelaar weapons rafloots tha dictator's dominance in 
tha realm of military thought.
Before examining this "revolution in military af-
fairs," it is clarifying to consider the fundamental in*
fluenoe of ideology on Stalinist military doctrine. Stalin
maintained that the POF1s, applicable to any national army,
were dearly on the side of the Sad Army. This was true
because of the Soviet Union's superior social system, as
well as the fact that the U.S.S.R. was " . . .  not waging
a predatory nor imperialistic war but a war which is
«
patriotic, liberating and just." Stalin further empha­
sised tha superior Soviat morale, economy and armaments.
Thus tha impact of ideology on Stalinist military thinking 
was substantial. This ideological, as wall as nationalistic, 
influence has continued to play a role in tha development 
of Soviat strategic doctrine. As the various tenets of 
post-Stalin doctrine are examined this will bacons evident.
m u m m i f f  to . J a m m u  .1111*11
The Soviet Union exploded its first atomic device 
in 1949, marking the beginning of what the Soviets eventually 
termed a revolution in military affairs. The revolution, 
oaused by an exponential increase in the destructive capacity
of weapons, was not publicly debated until after the death 
of Josef Stalin because of reasons previously discussed. 
However* lack of debate about the implications nuclear 
weapons would have for doctrine by no swans indicated a 
Soviet underestimation of their potential value. Soviet 
nuclear programs and the necessary institutions to oversea 
research and production were initiated before WWII,6 
Many have argued that the strategic force structure of 
the late fifties *nd even early sixties was the result of 
decisions made during Stalin's lifetime. The reasons 
for the laok of a corresponding doctrinal development 
probably eentar around the cult of personality and Stalin's 
utter domination in military affairs, furthermore* as 
far as Stalinist military theory was concerned, no single 
development in weapons technology oould substantially 
alter the significance and applicability of a doctrine 
based for the most part on a superior Soviet social system 
at well as a predetermined historic destiny. Yet the 
advent of nuclear weapons had indeed changed some of the 
traditional characteristics of armed conflict; it was
simply a matter of time before Soviet doctrine embraced
this reality.
Shortly after the death of Stalin an onslaught of 
debate over doctrine occurred in many of the leading 
niiitary*theoretieal journals. in view of the tight 
party oontrol and oversight of the Soviet press, it is 
likely that this debate over doctrine was encouraged by
/1 '
7the CPSV. Many began to challenge the applicability of 
Stalin'a POP's, in spite of their ideological attraction. 
The main point which was disputed was the issue of surprise. 
According to sons, surprise had becoM extreaMly important 
and perhaps even decisive due to the destructive nature 
of nuclear weapons as well as future prospects for their 
delivery. The increased utility of surprise on the 
strategic level, however, posed a direct challenge to the 
Permanently Operating Factors.
Host western analysts and scholars agree that the 
earliest significant challenges earn from Major General 
Talenskii, a former editor of the Ministry of Defense 
dally, Krasnalla Zveida. (had Star), and at that tine the 
editor of the leading Soviet military-theoretical journal, 
Voeanalla Myall, (Military Thought). So s m have suggested 
that Talenskii's rank and responsibility implies that he 
enjoyed a substantial amount of official backing at the 
tine.* Talenskii argued that the POP's were important, 
but not central, to military affairs of the day. The POP's 
were losing ground. The first concrete challenge to 
Stalinist military doctrine came, then, in the explicit 
recognition of the value of surprise in modern warfare, 
and the qualitative accomodation in doctrine which should 
logically follow.
After Talenskii, numerous challenges to Stalinist 
doctrine were found throughout the Soviet press, and by 
1956 references to the POP's were virtually nonexistent.
8The barrier to a real axanination of the fundamental 
change which had occurred in military affairs had finally 
baan lifted. Limitations on Soviet military thinking had 
bean significantly reduced, ha the importance of surprise 
in modern warfare became an accepted fact, considerable 
attention was given to the implications this would have 
on doctrine, strategy and, ultimately, force structure.
The initial period of a war thus became an issue of central 
importance.
As increased attention was given to the notion of 
surprise and the initial period of a war, the issue of 
pre-emption gained widespread consideration as well as 
support, especially in the military sector. The military- 
theoretical journal, vocnnalla Mval', considered the moat 
authoritative by soviet standards, began to endorse the 
view that the Soviet Onion should develop a pre-emptive 
nuclear strategy and capability, a surprise attack was 
recognised, in an objective strategic sense, as funda­
mentally relevant to the outcome of a nuclear war. Further­
more, a surprise attack was presented as a primary goal of
*
the "imperialists," who were ostensibly planning to wage 
a preventive war against the socialist nations.* The 
ideological influence on this facet of Soviet doctrinal 
development is unmistakable. By its own definition the
Mil IS i I. . ....... ....... .
•A preventive war may be defined as a war initiated in order 
to preclude any possibility of a similar attack from the 
enemy. A pre-emptive attack involves attacking the enemy 
first, once it becomes clear that an attack is imminent.
:1
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Soviet Onion is • nonaggrtssivt social system. Tho United 
States as well as the teat of the capitalist seep are by 
that safte definition imperialist and a pgr ssalvs. Seeause 
of plans by the O.S. to we«e a preventive war ayainat the 
O.S.S.ft. by eeana of a surprise first-strike, it wes 
clearly neoeasary for the Soviets to develop the Miens to 
pre-empt this surprise attaok when it appeared imminent.
After a policy of pra-eaption W M  advocated by an 
increasing number of military offleers, an editorial 
appeared in Voennalia Kval' which could not have been denseri
He oannot ignore the leaaons of history 
and we neat always tea ready for pre­
emptive actions against the perfidy of 
the aggressors.9
in the months following this 1955 editorial, articles 
advocating a policy of pre-emption, and therefore its 
incorporation into strategic doctrine, booses widssprood. 
other p-’blicationa seoh as tho ty^UjUg; emd K r ^ y ^ g .
fvetda endorsed a policy of pro swptlon.10 In asm, then, 
as far ss tha military aactor woe concerned, pre-emption 
wee e necessary treat  of Soviet strategic doctrine.
A policy of pre-emption wee perhaps the first
military einoe the imfctial recognition of the increased 
importance of surprise. For the purpose of this analysis 
it is essential to determine 1) whether pre-emption was 
acoapted as policy by tho Soviet political leadership,
and thus incorporated into official atratopic doctrine, 
and 2) whether *oviat etratepic weapons developownt pro* 
frMM were peered towards tha attainaant of a pra aajti f  
capability.
Tha "bosfcer pap” iaewe which civendhted widely in 
tha 0*3. national aaeurity eaaaeuni^y at. anody aa 19S4 
illustrates western auapiaaoa of aha hvaahapaant of a 
•oviat pre-eaptive capability- hcoaodinp aa «May Western 
estimates, Soviet prodaetiea at jat boaters was oa tha 
upawinp. in 19S0, thirty Soviet TP-4'a (Wadian Hants 
Senbera) vara eetiaeted to ba operational.11 by if55 
this estimate had prova to 1,ISO.1J while aha Soviet 
Tff-4 coaid not threaten a n t  araaa of tha oontiaaatal 
waited Itaaaa with aay aradibility (northwestern partiona 
af tie 3-8. waca vwlaerable to ana-way TP-4 niaaiona), 
tha T I M  poaad a aariaaa throat to forward baaad bcabara 
in larapa. further apprahanaion wee arouaad by oonourrant 
Soviet Oawolapwanta of tha "Sieon* haavy jat hnmtar aa 
wail aa tha ••ear* turbojat, which could directly threaten 
the continental United Stataa.
Tha aubatantial build-up of doviat boaber forces 
in tha year* aurrouadinp tha pra-caption discussion must 
now ba oonaiderad alonpaida a loop atandinp eleaaat of 
foviat atratopic ailitary policy. Thia ia the notion of 
oountarforoa ailitary tarpotinp. foviat military atratapy 
haa oonaiataatly hold that primary atratapic objectives 
try, firat and foamapt, tie dtoPy’a armed fc?ee than-
selves. This continual to apply in the neelemr erne, me 
Soviet Marihil v.o. Sokolovskii has amphsefom* in an 
authoritative work, 'jmMl-JJL «Uitaty Witts^ ) M
examined together with this aiasnnt of strategy, tha 
developments of tha 1950's saam consiitant with tha dooeiep* 
want of a prs-emptive strategy. Actual bomber prsduetiem 
indicates accsptancs by tha political laadarship of soah 
a policy. Harbart Dinaritain, noted for his analysis of 
tha aarly development of Soviet strategic doctrine* #©e- 
tends that tha wide press exposure enjoyed by thoaa ad­
vocating tha development of a pre-emptive capability it 
in itsalf representative of an acceptance of the policy 
of pre-emption by the political leadership, in view of
ii
its close supervision of all elements of the prose.
Further evidence of this acceptance of pre-emption as 
official policy may be found in Soviet ICiM development of 
tha 1960's, which stressed extremely heavy missile pay- 
loads, a strategic necessity in oounterforoe targeting.
It must be emphasised that the development of a 
pre-emptive facet of strategic doctrine seems to be re­
garded by the Soviets as purely defensive in nature. This 
is true in spite of the fact that the force structures 
required for pre-emption were easily perceivable in the 
objective sense as offensive first strike weapons. What 
separates a Soviet decision to develop the first-strike 
oounterforoe capability neoeesary for pre-emption from any 
similar initiative 1st the (halted ftates is simply the
12
fact that the peace-loving socialist camp is not capable 
of waging an aggressive preventive war. The U.S. is viewed 
as planning precisely this.
The fact that a credible Soviet pre-emptive 
capability was in reality extremely limited at the time 
of these decisions is of secondary importance in terms of 
this analysis. For our purposes, it is essential to 
recognise that what was advocated initially by the military 
sector was eventually accepted by the political leadership, 
and translated into weapons development programs. Pre­
empt ion any be considered an operational component of 
Soviet strategic doctrine. The strategic value of surprise 
in the nueliar era hes been given widespread attention in 
the Soviet press; a pre-emptive policy is a natural, 
logical outgrowth of sueh attention. The pre-emption issue 
has also been utilised in this analysis of strategic 
doctrine as a "case study," determining leadership 
receptivity to a policy advocated initially by the military. 
However, it will become clear in later sections that the 
political leadership's propensity to incorporate military 
policy recommendations into official strategic doctrine 
has significantly decreased since the development of 
relative policy between East and West, as well as policies 
oriented towards political detente under th«* Brezhnev 
leadership.
Shortly after the policy of pre-emption became
»
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firmly entrenched in strategic doctrine, several other 
doctrinal components were added throughout the late 1950's 
and into the 1960's. While much of the debate over actual 
doctrinal content occurred in the pages of military 
journals, it is useful to examine statements by the po­
litical leadership in determining those tenets with apparent 
official sanction. For this we must turn to policy guide­
lines presented at the various Communist Party congresses.
Soviet strategic doctrine began to assume a 
definite shape at the 20th party congress in 1956. Many 
of the initial Soviet statements regarding the position of 
nuclear weapons within the doctrinal framework were made 
at this time. Weapons of mass destruction were clearly 
intended to comprise the backbone of the Soviet defense 
posture relative to the West. Marshal Zhukov elaborated 
on strategic policy, stressing the type of war the Soviets 
expected should it break outt
. . . \ future war, if they [imperialists! 
unleash it, will be characterised by mass 
application of the air forces, various 
rocket weapons and various means of mass 
destruction, such as atomic, thermonuclear 
chemical and bacteriological . . .15
Implicit in Marshal Zhukov's statement is the Soviet 
concept of escalation at that timei The next war will 
inevitably escalate into a strategic thermonuclear war. 
This inevitability of escalation became a key component 
of Soviet strategic doctrine throughout the late 1950's
15
strategic thinking. It# earliest roots are found in 
Stalinist military science: The POF's will always be on
the side of the Soviet Union. It is significant to note 
that while surprise has been recognised as a decisive 
factor in the oufcccsm of a war, it has never been con­
sidered to be the decisive factor. Soviet doctrine holds 
that a superior social system cannot lose a war, conventional 
or nucleer. A 1964 issue of Vosnnalia Mysl1 explains}
. . .  no matter how high the level of 
military-technical progress, the basic, 
objective law of war, formulated by Lenin, 
will not cease to operate: He will gain
the victory in war who has the greateet 
reserves, the greateet sources of strength, 
aid the greatest support among the masses 
of people.11
Por Soviet doctrine, even technological developments such 
as nuclear weapons cannot alter this basic law. Sokolovskii 
amphsisas in Military Styatggy that while surprise is 
indeed important, political and socio-economic factors 
continue to play the decisive role.*® In this sense, 
then, Stalin's POP's continue to bear on strategic doctrine.
Any doubts concerning the existence of the 
"socialist victory" axiom as a central tenet of Soviet 
strategic doctrine were quelled by Khrushchev's address 
at the 20th party congress of 1996s
. . .  it is possible to hear from the 
prominent statesmen of bourgeois nations 
the candid acknowledgement that in a war 
with the application of atomic wespons 
"there won't be a victor.” These states­
men still hesitate to admit, that capitalism
will find itself in the grave in a 
new world war . . .20
Dafanaa Miniatar Malinousky aehoad this idaa five yea .tv 
latar at tha 22nd party congress;
We are deeply convinced, that in thia 
war, if tha imparialiata impose it upon 
ua, tha aocialiat camp will win, as 
capitalism will be destroyed forever.21
Tha praotioal requirements for tha fulfillment of such 
pronouncements are numerous. Perhaps the most important 
of these, however, is a functional war survival capability 
facilitated through policies of damage limitation.
k widely publicised tenet of Soviet strategic 
doctrine in the west has been the well-organised Soviet 
civil defense program. Unfortunately, much of Wastorn 
strategic thought is highly suspect of the development 
of damage limitation capabilities; such a policy is 
often perceived as veritable preparation for the initiation 
of a nuclear war and therefore inherently aggressive.
Suoh perceptions seem to be supported further by evidence 
of a Soviet hard target first strike capability manifested 
in the high yield ICIM, the Soviet S8-9. However, while 
such strategic policies seem offensive, aggressive and 
incompatible with western notions of strategic doctrine, 
they comprise an integral component of a warfighting 
doctrine and strategy. Soviet strategic doctrine has 
throughout its development been characteriied by the
V ,
propensity to look beyond ths initiation of nuclear 
hostilities. Development of damage limitation eapabili- 
ties is a product of this Soviet attitude. As Major* 
General v. Matvienko pointed out in a party journali
The preparation of the rear of the country 
for defense against weapons of mass destruction 
is becoming one of the most decisive strategic 
factors in ensuring the vital activity of the 
state in wartime. The winning of victory in 
war depends in the final count on the standard 
of this preparation. . . . Civil defense is 
now a factor of strategic importance in en­
suring the vital activity of the state.22
Endorsements of the strategic importance of Soviet damage 
limitation are not limited to the ranks of Soviet military 
officers. Civilian policy analyst Qeorgii Arbatov has
referred to the necessity of civil defense in the nuclear
23 24age, as has former Minister of Defense Grechko. The
late Soviet leader Leonid Breshnev endorsed a policy of
a further strengthening of the Soviet Civil defense pro-
25gram in 1967.
Damage limitation is a longstanding tenet of Soviet 
strategic doctrine. It is a tenet with acknowledged 
strategic value and crucial to a doctrine based on the 
concept of fighting and winning a nuclear war. As Leon 
Gourd has pointed out in Mar Survival in Soviet Strategyi
They (the Soviets) believe that a capability 
to destroy the enemy is not sufficient for 
attaining victory in a nuclear war, and that 
it must be paralleled by a capability to sur­
vive such a war . . . such a capability . . .
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must b« a logical and essential part of 
tha Soviet military posture.2*
Gourd is implying that tha Soviet civil defense program 
contributes to the overall Soviet defease posture. Civil 
defense in Soviet doctrine not only serves the more 
obvious function of limiting casualties and facilitating 
successful conduct of the war,* but also, on a mere sublime 
level, influences the perceptions of the enemy by strength­
ening the credibility of the Soviet threat, which hinges 
upon the ability to fight a nuclear war should it occur.
Zn discussing the Soviet doctrinal guarantee of 
successful completion of a nuclear war, it is essential 
to recognise possible motivations behind aueh declarations. 
Chile M-L ideology has in many cases failed to provide 
practical guidelines for the conduct of Soviet foreign 
policy, or an accurate assessment of international 
political realities, it continues to play a vital role 
in the Soviet domestic realm. Ideology is the Soviet 
government's principal legltimiser, and it is not erroneous 
to attribute assertions of victory in a nuclear war to the 
maintenance of the ideology's applicability in the eyes 
of the echelons of officers in the Soviet Armed forces, 
as veil as the Soviet population at large. Moreover, 
claims of inevitable Soviet victory must have their affect 
on the perceptions of the enemy.
•A viable population, economy and political system under the 
condition* of modern war is axiomatic in Soviet doctrine.
Taken In tun, that* tenets of Soviet strategic 
doctrine formed in the late it30*a and early l»60's, .he 
notions of pre-emption, escalation, Soviet victory 
and damage limitation comprise its framework. rrom this 
basis, additions and adjustments in later years will be 
analysed and discussed. Doctrinal development by no means 
ended here. In discussing the implications and other 
characteristics of Soviet doctrine, it will beooate necessary 
to refer back to this basic framework.
It is clear that Soviet doctrinal development has 
from the outset centered around the possibility that war 
may be unleashed, and it is necessary to prepare for such 
a possibility. Because of this nature, then, Soviet stra­
tegic doctrine has been deemed a "warfighting* doctrine 
in many Western circles. The implications of this ere 
vast. In light of the apparent warfighting character 
of Soviet doctrine, it is helpful to draw parallel with 
Western strategic concepts, analysing differences and 
similarities.
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Sictlon III Warfighting *i a Deterrent
Perhaps tha moat fundaawntal difficulty in analyzing
tha strategic ralationahip between tha superpowers in tha
♦
oatanaibla incompatibility of strategic doctrine*. Soviet 
doctrine is aeap times perceived as an inherently aggreaeive, 
warmongering doctrine with its concentretion on the pri­
macy of tha offensive, the necessity of deawgm 1 instant ion, 
and tha wlaasbllity of a thermonuclear wer. Bosh psc- 
captions are unfounded. The ultimate goal of Ssw&st atr- 
tagie doettrine is the detarreace ot apfirooei i’iii- the 
dif f i£3#Ll&£M #r3»## wh#n tit# m # M  of 
### mmm&mmA • tJM *^*1 ^ x/A 
thMi m h n  h# v  m M
nr#crrmn#or 1 o## About ohat a do 1 L&® of o&ratoeric <ioii#fy#fiftD 
should sntail, it is difficult far many «e on— tine Soviet 
strategic doctrine on its awn serins. Soviet etrecegic 
doctrine, in general terse, defines ths ability of the 
breed Forces to deter an attack as dirsctly proportional 
to their ability to fight and win a nuclear war.
Western strategic doctrine makes key distinctions 
between "deterrence" on the one hand, and "defense" on 
the other. Meny in the West parcaive defensive measures 
such as ABN systarns and civil dsfsnss programs as prepara­
tion* for s first-striks and inharently "destabilizing." 
Yet for a doctrine involving warfighting and damage
■1 sfe/. 'i/ .K 'k ' ■?" ::i.V ‘is- ri: '-:m
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limitation, the notion of defense is an integral part of 
tha overall objective of deterrence. Soviet doctrine 
does not distinguish between these two concepts. Rather, 
a strong defease serves to enhance the deterrent capability 
of the Soviet Armed Forces. The best iteration of this 
notion is offered by David Holloway, in his own study 
of Soviet doctrine. He states, "Two themes have been 
stressed in this survey of Soviet thinking about nuclear 
war. The prevention of such a war, and preparation to
wage it. In Soviet thinking these two aspects are not
27oonflictory, but complementary.■ Defense does not enjoy 
the same prominence in tiestern strategic doctrine because 
it is considered to be quite destabilising. Negative 
perceptions surrounding defense as an element of strnteyy 
in tha Nest have had a detrimental effect on our own ability 
to consider objectively the notion of defense as a com­
ponent of Soviet strategic doctrine.
An essential component of Mutually Assured De­
struction is the notion of "force sufficiency." MAD 
recognises that once an Assured Destruction capability 
is attained, further stockpiling is essentially redundant, 
what remains for strategic policy in this case, then, is 
simply to maintain the credibility of that second-strike 
capability. However, these notions of sufficiency are for 
the most part incompatible with a doctrine concentrating 
on warfighting. As far as Soviet strategic thought is
concerned, nothing could bo more alien than a policy of "fore* 
sufficiency." This is not to assert that the Soviet Union will 
forever engage in a relentless military build-up. it is prob­
able, however, that Soviet strategic policies will continue to 
regard international stability as contingent upon a decidedly 
strong and credible strategic posture. Boris Ponomarev, head 
of the International Department of the Secretariat of the CPSU, 
interprets the role of Soviet military powers
Poroe in and of itself is not a vice.
What is important is in whose hands it 
is and for what purposes it is used.
Pore* in the hands of socialism has 
become the source providing peace and .. 
the weakening of military danger . . .
While Ponomarev's statement bears the traditional ideo­
logical coloration concerning the justness of the socialist 
course and consequently socialist weapons, it is nonethe­
less important to recognise the implications of sueh an 
attitude. Pores on the Soviet side is just» their own 
interpretation of this justness affects what is sufficient 
and what is not. Por a warfighting doctrine, whet is 
characterised in the Most as destabilising or overkill 
merely contributes to the Soviet deterrent posture.
Bssentially it is a policy of "peace through strength;" 
strength on the Soviet side can only contribute to further 
stability.
Purther difficulties surrounding Soviet doctrinal 
embracement of notion of force sufficiency center
around the Soviet conception of equality, or what they 
call "equal security." What way be sufficient for one 
nation may be insufficient for another* Soviet strategic 
posture is not only a response to the American arsenal, 
but those of China, Britain, and France as well. Varying 
geopolitical conditions generate different military-strategic 
requirements. The Soviet interpretation of security 
reflects this.
A final problem Soviet strategic doctrine has with 
force sufficiency hinges on the Soviet, as well as Russian, 
historical experience. A history of foreign military 
intervention and occupation has had a tremendous impact 
on the Soviet strategic mindset. Tsarist as well as 
communist policies throughout history have held that when 
pre-eminent militarily, state foreign policy is relatively 
aggressive and expansionary, aimed at eliminating or even 
precluding possible enemy aggression. Because of this 
historical experience, maintenance of a decidedly strong 
military arsenal is instinctual for this nation; the 
concept of force sufficiency is not only a relatively new 
aspect of military affairs, but alien to Soviet strategic 
thinking as well.
Western strategic doctrine has distinguished 
between two types of deterrence. One of these is the 
concept of "deterrence by punishment," which has traditionally 
espoused the inevitability of retaliation as the ultimate 
means of insuring that a deterrent relationship will
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continue. Because of the destructive capabilities of 
nuclear weapons, a survivable retaliatory capability was 
interpreted to be a much more credible means of insuring 
peace than any attempt at defending against a nuclear 
attack. This notion of defense, then, is embodied in the 
ether type of deterrence, "deterrence by denial." A 
policy of denial is oriented around the belief that the 
best means of deterring an aggressor is by maintaining 
the ability to defend against any possible attack. With 
its stress on damage limitation and the primscy of the 
military target, Soviet strategic doctrine is beat character 
ised by the notion of deterrence by denial. Such a strategy 
is the product of a traditional military approach to the 
manageamnt of defense policy. Denying the enemy victory 
by actively (and passively) defending against an attack is 
practically am axiom to the professional military mind.
In the West, the "revolution in military affairs" produced 
by nuclear weapons prompted a qualitative shift in the 
manner in which armed conflict was considered. Policies 
moved from deterrence by denial to deterrence by retalia­
tory punishment, due to the exponential increase in 
destructive capabilities, and the implicit recognition in 
the heat that there was no defense against these weapons. 
While Soviet strategic doctrine acknowledges that the 
emergence of nuclear weapons has prompted a re-evaluation 
of the nature of armed conflict in the modern era, national 
security management has nevertheless continued to abide by
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a policy of denial. In this tans*, than, Soviet doctrine 
does not reflect the qualitative change in anted conflict 
to the extent that Western doctrine has. There are several 
reasons for this. Probably the most influential of these 
concerns the attitudes and values of the individuals who 
discuss and formulate Soviet defense policies.
National security management in the United States 
is dominated by civilian actors. In contrast, the majority 
of the individuals who analyse and enact Soviet defense policy 
are members of the Soviet military establishment. As a 
consequence, Soviet strategic doctrine has assumed a defi­
nite traditional military complexion. This "man on horse­
back” legacy and its accompanying valises have manifested 
themselves to a substantial degree in doctrine. It is 
because of these traditional military values that Soviet 
doctrine fails to embrace notions of force sufficiency, 
or hold Assured Destruction policies at the foundation of 
defense policy. Admitting that there is no defense is 
essentially defeatist to many 3oviet strategic thinkers. 
Relying on a "balance of terror" as the guarantor of 
deterrence and international stability makes little military 
sense to the Soviets, predominantly because such a policy 
ultimately depends on the goodwill and ultimately the 
rationality of the enesty.
Ideological influence is also responsible in a 
large mesusra for the warfighting nature of Soviet strategic 
doctrine. Soviet doctrinal acknowledgement that a nuclear
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war would noon the and of civilisation, i.a., aoeopt tha 
notion of MAO, would dir act ly challenge to an ideology 
which guarantees a socialist victory in spite of the 
diet .is of technology. Western doctrine in a large sense 
is a product of this recognition that nuclear war is 
mutual suicide. MAD, as a doctrine, merely follows. A 
warfighting doctrine is the natural consequence of a failure 
to recognise that nuclear war is the end of the world.
Xn spite of the numerous differences between the 
competing strategic doctrines, the Soviets do indeed follow 
a policy of strategic deterrence. Soviet recognition 
of this notion was evident by the late 1950's. Statements 
by the Minister of Defense R. Y. Malinovsky indicates an 
acceptance of the concept of strategic deterrence as a 
fundamental goal of Soviet strategic policyt
Ns have made the study . : . of the means 
of reliable repellenoe (otrasheniie) of a 
surprise aueleer attack t'e main task for 
all our armed foreea, and also the means 
of frustration of his aggressive thoughts 
by way of a timely infliction of a shattering 
blow upee him.w
the latter section of this statement clearly 
implies the endorsement of pre-emptive policies which 
were widespread at that time. However, Malinovsky's 
opening statement is of interest in this case. In speaking 
of "reliable resilience" of the aggressor, Malinovsky is 
embracing the underlying principle of strategic deterrence. 
The Soviet approach to this goal, however, is simply
addressed in a different manner than it ia in tha Wait.
Tha nature of tha da tar rant function of a war* 
fighting atratagy ia further axplainad by an anamination of 
major inputa to atratagic thought and doctrine. Tha 
majority of theee originata in tha Soviet military. An 
anamination of military pronouncements illuatrataa this 
factor's intarpratation of deterrence.
As Jonathon Lockwood haa pointed out, it ia clear 
after an examination of available Soviat printed material 
that atratagic doctrine ia by no maana an ironclad act of 
official viawa and interpretation of tha atratagic relation 
ahip between tha auparpowara. Considerable difficulty a* 
rises out of attempts to determine what is official policy 
and what is not. For example, glaring inconsistencies 
exist between statements made by civilian political leaders 
and those assertions originating in the military sector. 
Individuals in the Nest who argue that Soviat strategic 
doctrine is essentially aggressive frequently cite military 
publications as evidence. Strategic doctrine, as discussed 
by the military, is a warfighting doctrine, stressing the 
need to be constantly prepared to fight and win a nuclear 
war, ami even develop military superiority over the enemy. 
Furthermore, discussion of strategic defense policies seems 
in most eases to be restricted to the military sector and 
a few related policy study institutes. Because of the 
virtual monopoly maintained by the Soviet military over
28
discussion of national dafansa issues, it is tempting to 
elevate much of what the military advocates as policy to 
an official level fully sanctioned by the party leadership. 
However, such an approach would ignore statements made by 
civilian political actors which in many eases weaken the 
credibility of the military sector as the determiner of 
Soviet strategic policies. Furthermore, it is evident 
that a strategic doctrine emphasising warfighting and war 
winning serves other functions within the Soviet Armed 
Forces themselves, such as simply maintaining battle 
preparedness as well as morale. Finally, upon a thorough 
examination of statements emanating specifically from the 
military sactor, endorsements can indeed be found which 
refer to such popular Western notions as deterrence through 
retaliation.
Many strategic analysts who claim that Soviet 
strategic doctrine is an altogether aggressive, war fighting 
doctrine cite authoritative military-theoretical journals 
suoh as Voonnalla Mvsl* in support of their conclusions. 
indeed, some of these articles in the Soviet military press 
leave the reader with a sense of doubt over whether the 
U.S.S.R. is serious about avoiding World war 111. it is 
clear after examination that some of the articles and 
statements may be construed to ignore the political and 
technical realities of the nuclear era, asserting that 
victory in a nuclear war is not only possible but definite 
for the O.S.S.R.
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It is accurst* to argue that th* military aactor 
of the Soviat Union, in ganaral tarns, propounds curtain 
views on stratagic doetrina which are unique to the 
military. However, by no means is th* military sector 
a homoganaous collection of individuals advocating a single 
monolithic policy of warfightimg and superiority over the 
enemy, without recognition of notions of datarranc* 
through retaliation and Assured Destruction. The Soviat 
military press must ba examined realistically. These 
publications constitute a forum for debate and discussion 
of strategic policy. Subtle differences do exist within 
the military press? these inconsistencies have important 
implications for the actual content of Soviet strategic 
doctrine.
Examination of Voennaila Mysl* reveals the existence 
of numerous assertions (or adaiissiona) of policies and 
strategies other than those characterised by a strictly 
warfighting doctrine. These differing views weaken the 
credibility of those arguing that th* military sector 
advocates purely warfighting policies and is ignorant of 
the political and technical realities of the nuclear era.
Most significant of these is an implicit recognition 
of th* concept of Assured Destruction and its deterrent 
value. Such was an argument in a 1963 issue of Voennaila 
Mysl1»
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t
. . . the attainment of success in battle 
in nuciiar war, too, requires the securing 33 
of superiority of forest over the enemy . . . *
The purpose of the preceding comparison of state­
ments within the military press, specifically the most 
authoritative of these, the restricted journal voeiinalla 
ttys11, is to illustrate that differances do exist within 
the military. It must be recognised from this comparison 
that nation of deterrence by retaliation, while complimen­
tary to the concept of warfighting, are nonetheless 
components of Soviet strategic doctrine.
Recognising that concepts such as deterrence by 
retaliation are present in Soviet strategic thought 
raises on important issue. The Soviets are indeed aware 
of the deterrent function of the maintenance of an AO 
capability. Yet clearly Soviet doctrine holds that such 
a policy is by itself insufficient. Perhaps the most 
fundamental motivation for a warfighting doctrine espousing 
such notions as damage limitation, pre-emption and counter- 
tores targeting is the belief that relying on a policy of 
strategic deterrence through the maintenance of an adequate 
second strike capability lacks real credibility. Herein 
lies the main problem Soviet strategic thinkers seem to have 
with the Western notion of MAD. The Soviet leadership, 
especially the military, feels that no state can credibly 
threaten war if they feel it is, in reality, suicidal.
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Mli it a doctrina is incompatible with lovitt military 
thinking. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this is by 
examining a period of Soviet doctrinal development In 
the mid-1950's.
One of the most revealing facets of Soviet doctri­
nal development was a step towards the acceptance of a 
concept resembling Mutually Assured Destruction by a 
portion of the political leadership. This occurred 
during the leadership struggle between Khrusehehev and 
Malsn’kov between 1934 and 1956. in early lfSl 0. M. Halah’kov
was Chairman of the Council of Ministers, far a v 
period of time, he made several references to what
a central tenet of MAO. with the "revolution in military 
affairs," according to Helen'kov, the possibility ter I 
lasting peace had finally arrived. We rsaeonidi
. . . The Soviet government stands ter further 
relaxation of international ftdiifA; let fit* 
and lasting peace and regal) 
polity if told war for thi#
§r«|§ratlen for * now w e e n  hdiaai
N Ilf I
2 i i rm Itawnt means of wadlfti/ J H M  t
dtrUction if world civilisation,”
Wilin'kov had smWMetd ths notion of autmel de«* rust ion.
Nil ill I dipirtSM Iroa the traditional soviet perspsetive
if its own hitteriesl destiny* namely, the iamvitatla 
victory of seeinliem over the fereee a* empeetaiism. rur- 
thermere, however, Malsn'kev's stance tmd aari nus impli- 
sationa far the role of the Soviet Araod pumee. m• 
assessment of the ourrant State Of affairs poaed a significant
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challenge to much of what waa at that time being espoused 
in the military press.
At this point Soviet strategic doctrine seems to 
have become a practical instrument for obtaining support 
and influence within the domestic power struggle which 
ensued. while Malen'kov stressed that the presence of 
nuclear weapons on both sides had implicitly reinforced 
the prospects for peace, Khrushchev continued to stress 
that the oapitalist block was preparing for a war against 
the Soviet Union. Nikolai Bulganin stated at that timet
. . . we do not have the right to waste time 
. . .  it is well known that he who does not 
go forward falls behind; and the backward 
are beaten . . . we must always be ready to 
give a crushing rebuff to any enemy no matter 
what he possesses . .
By 19S6 Malen'kov had boen twice demoted, and it became 
clear that "the destruction of world civilization" was 
not going to form the backbone of any Soviet defense 
policy. The brief challenge to Khrushchev by the 
Malen'kov-Molotov-Kaganovich faction a year later failed, 
as Khrushchev enjoyed the support of Marshal ?-hukov and 
the Armed Forces. Clearly the military supported uot 
only a defsnse build-up but a strategic doctrine which 
excluded any notion of inevitable or mutual destruction. 
Malenkov's influence may have been visible in the declared 
Soviet defense budgets of 1955 and 1956; both were 
smaller than the preceding y e a r s . H o w e v e r ,  by 1957, defense
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spending began to increase.36
The warfighting charactar of Soviet strategic 
doctrine is not only a product of influences within the 
U.3.S.R. Attention must be paxd to its external ihfiuiineaa. 
U.S. strategic policies play a significant role. The 
next section explains this. The military support finally 
awarded Khrushchev in this leadership struggle with 
Helen'kov hinged in large measure on the candidates' per­
ceptions of U.S. policy and the reaction of the Soviet 
military to these perceptions.
35
3*otion UU Soviet Threat Perceptions
It is difficult to appreciate Soviet strategic 
doctrine without considering U.S. strategic doctrine end 
its inpact on Soviet perceptions. Soviet strategic doctrine 
is, in a very real sense, influenced by the manner in which 
U.S. itrategic policies are perceived by the Soviet leader­
ship. Any strategic doctrine is geared to meeting a threat; 
the nature of that threat must be reflected in the doctrine 
which answers to it.
In January of 1954 the American Secretary of State 
Dulles publicised the doctrine of "massive retaliation."
As a counter to Soviet expansionism and as a complement to 
a policy of containment, the United States would retain 
the option of a strategic nuclear response in the event 
of even limited Soviet expansion. Massive retaliation 
implied an increased willingness on the part of the 
Americans to use nuclear weapons over a larger spread of 
contingencies. That the United States was capitalising 
on what was at that time clear U.S. strategic superiority 
is of fundamental importance in understanding Soviet per­
ceptions of the political applications of strategic 
military powor. Jonathon S. Lockwood, in a recent book,
The Soviet View of U.S. Strategic Doctrine, stresses correctly 
that Soviet perceptions of the political value of strategic 
capability, and the ability to threaten credibly its use, 
were shaped during the period of U.S. strategic superiority
and th« doctrine of massive retaliation which accompanied
37it. Lockwood atrassaa further that tha impression left 
on tha Soviets must have bean strongs
Tha Soviets perceived themselves as restrained 
by 0.8. nuclear superiority during this period 
. . . with the exception of the Hungarian revo­
lution in 1986, the Soviet use of military 
power during the period of the massive retali­
ation doctrine was confined to threats and 
military maneuvers.38
Tha impact of massive retaliation on the Soviet political 
and military leadership must not be underestimated. The 
U.S.S.R. experienced firsthand the political benefits 
that strategic superiority offered.
Soviet pursuance of a pre-emptive capability as 
discussed earlier must clearly be considered to be, in 
part, a result of the U.S. doctrine of massive retaliation. 
Fears of a preventive war unleashed by the United States 
were exacerbated by America's latest announced policy. 
According to a former Marshal of Tank Forces Rotmistrov, 
a U.S. surprise attack could not be permitted!
. . . the duty of the Soviet Armed Forces 
is not to permit an enemy surprise attack 
on our country, and, in the event of an 
attempt to accomplish one, not only to rapel 
the attack successfully but also deal the 
enemy counterblows, or even pre-emptive 
(upreshdayushchiie) surprise blows of 
terrible destructive force.39
Thus, an dajactive of Soviet strategic policy was 
therefore to create and maintain the ability to deliver
the first blow in s nuolssr conflict. Pre-emption ns a 
doctrinal component, than, was not only s result of 
1) sn ideology which held that the U.S.S.R. should expect 
a surprise attack, end I) the value of Military targets, 
but also as a result of ah apparently aggressive u.S. 
doctrine as perceived by the Soviets.
Another aspect of Soviet doctrinal development 
which is directly attributable to U.S. strategic forces 
and policies is what has been generally known in the 
West as the period of Soviet "missile deception." A 
primary goal of Soviet strategic policy in the years 
centering around the U.S. doctrine of "massive retaliation" 
was an attempt to undermine the credibility of U.S. 
strategic superiority. The 20th party congress in 1953 
was a forum for the Soviet reaction to "massive recall* 
ation." In his report to the congress that year, the 
Minister of Defense, Marshal Zhukov, stated:
. . . the Soviet Armed Forces now have assorted
atomic and thermonuclear weapons, mighty..
rockets, and jets of various types . . .
It is abundantly clear that the Soviets were attempting 
to deceive the U.S. concerning actual Soviet strategic 
capabilities. Soviet doctrinal stress on the inevitability 
of escalation discussed earlier also comprises an aspect 
of Soviet "missile deception." in reality, however, a 
Soviet long-range jet capability was in its infant stage.
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Moreover, "mighty rockets” were not operational in the 
Soviet Onion until the early 1960's.
Soviet missile deception seems to have reeched 
e climax in the late 19S0's. the successful launch of 
the Soviet "sputnik* may have lended Khrushchev's attempts 
to deceive the West at least a modicum of credibility.
The General Secretary capitalised on this issue at the 
21st party congress in 19S9t
It's quite obvious, that if the Soviet 
Onion is able to send a rocket thousands 
of kilometers into space, then it is able 
to send, without a miss, powerful rockets 
to any point of the globe.*1'
Khrushchev went even further on the score, to the point of 
alluding to possible Soviet strategic superiority at the 
XCBM level:
. . . Today, . . . when the preeminence in 
the development of rocket technology is on 
our side, we once again invite the U.S.,
O.K. and France: Let's prohibit the testing, ,-
production and application of nuclear weapons. *
It is interesting to note that such pronouncements con­
cerning Soviet strategic prowess during this period, 
however false and misleading, may have had a significant 
impact on U.S. strategic programs. In 1961 the Kennedy 
administration initiated a large and comprehensive defense 
build-up, doubling XCBM production as well as stepping up 
development of the Polaris SLBM program. It is difficult 
to assert that such U.S. initiatives were not, to some
degree, * result of the perceived Soviet threat end capa­
bility. The impact of these measures on the Soviets was 
significant. Many observers single out the Kennedy pro** 
grans as the stimulus for a modification which seems to 
have occurred in the early 1960's. The Soviet civil 
defense program (PVO) was reorganised in 1961, and placed 
under the authority of the Ministry of Defense. According 
to Michael McGwire, Soviet ICBM development increasingly 
concentrated on more megatonnage geared to counterforee
options, as well as a stepped up development of the Soviet 
43Navy. McGwire characterises these Soviet initiatives 
as a shift in doctrinal content from earlier periods.
Just a year before these 1961 Soviet defense policy 
initiatives, Soviet policies and pronouncements seemed to 
indicate a step towards a Western conception of mutual 
strategic deterrence, although such pronouncesMnts did not 
go so far as to endures mutual annihilation. In 1960, 
at the 4th session of the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev out­
lined forthcoming reductions in the troop levels of the 
ground forcesi
Our scientists, engineers and workers, occupied 
with the defense, have created new aspects of 
armament,, the most contemporary • • • this gives 
us the chance to embark on a reduction of the 
Armed Forces without damage to the defense 
capacity of the country.4*
Months before, at the 21st Party Congress, a new branch 
of the Armed Forces, the Strategic Rocket Forces, were
formed. McGwire offora those pronouncement* and polioie* 
ee evidence of an implicit Soviat acceptance of Western 
dootrinal assumptions. However, it teem* likelier that 
such policies represent not a recognition and endorsement 
of Western strategic ocneapts, but simply an increased 
Soviet relianee on nuclear weapons as the primary component 
of Soviet defense posture. The essential warfighting 
character is constant throughout doctrinal development. 
Notions of pre-emption, counterfcre strategies, damage 
limitation and war survival are longstanding tenets of 
Soviet doctrine, evident in pre-1961 doctrine as well as 
post-1961 doctrine. What should be interpreted, then, 
from th* reorganisation of Scviet civil defense and 
increased counterforce and naval development is the rein­
forcement of a traditional warfighting doctrine, rather 
than a shift from one doctrinal orientation to another.
It is essential to recognize for the purposes of this 
analysis that the increase in Soviet attention to war 
survival and warfighting occurring in the early 1960's 
is due in large measure to the perceived threat posed by 
O.S. strategic policies at that time. Such policies, then, 
intensified Soviet doctrinal concentration on strategies 
of counterforee and dasuge limitation.
It should be clear from the preceding survey of 
the interaction of American and Soviet strategic doctrines 
that any examination of a nation's doctrinal development 
requires at least an appraisal of its enemy counterpart.
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Evidence indicates that as U.S. defense policies were 
increasingly geared towards higher defense spending and 
weapons proeuresnnt, the warfighting orientation of Soviet 
doctrine intensified. American development of long-range 
nuclear weapons in the early 1960's insured vast U.S. 
superiority for most of the decade. However, by the late 
1960's, Soviet long-range strategic missile programs were 
coming to fruition. Most observers agree that Soviet 
attaimsent of relative strategic parity occurred at this 
time. Soviet attainment.of relative parity with the United 
States, and its implications on Soviet behavior, percep­
tions and ultimately doctrine will now be addressed.
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Section XV» Political— Strategic Pow«r
The reality of relative strategic parity between 
the superpower* since the beginning of the 1970*a has 
brought about significant changes in both the content and 
scope of Soviet strategic doctrine. These changes include 
a decrease in attention given to several of the traditional 
doctrinal tenets associated with the notion of warfighting, 
and an increased recognition of such concepts as strategic 
stability and the strategic balance, a* interpreted by 
the bulk, of Western doctrine. A manifestation of such a 
recognition is visible in a relatively recent addition to 
doctrine, that of foreign policy initiatives on the per­
iphery, supported if necessary by military power projection 
in a conventional mode.
It is the purpose of this section to analyse recent 
developments in Soviet strategic doctrine from the stand­
point of the concept of strategic parity, and its implica­
tions on Soviet thought, behavior and policies. The time 
period under scrutiny not only includes Soviet attainment 
of relative parity with the United States, but also a 
substantial increase in Soviet military reach as well as 
influence over a large portion of the globe.
Policy discussions by the Soviet leadership during 
the late 1950's and continuing through the mid-1960's 
were clearly characterised by the notion of warfighting. 
Espousals of pre-emptive policies and endorsements of the
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winnability of a nuclear war enjoyed widespread attention 
in both party and military circles. In contrast, the Soviet 
political leadership of the 1970's and 1980's has to a 
large degree separated itself from several of the classic 
warfighting doctrinal components which dominated the 
majority of doctrinal development. Even the military sector, 
traditionally an ardent proponent of an offensively oriented 
warfighting doctrine has softened up in its discussion of 
strategic affairs.
A principal development in recent years has been 
the disavowal of an offensively oriented oriented doctrine. 
The "defensive" nature of Soviet strategic policies has 
proven to be a central theme:
In counterbclffce to Soviet doctrine, 
which if strictly defensive in nature,
U.S. military doctrine emphasizes a 
first-pre-emptive strike, many different 
uses for nuclear weapons, and the pos- 
sibility of a limited nuclear war . . .
This statement is significant in that it denies 
pre-emption, as well as the possibility of applying nuclear 
weapons in other scenarios, as elements of strategy in­
cluded in Soviet doctrine. Moreover, in associating 
such strategies with our offensive and aggressive doctrine, 
these recent pronouncements shed a sinister light on the 
Soviet Union's own strategic doctrine throughout it.; 
development, which advocated precisely those strategies 
which today's leadership condemn as dangerous. In addition
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to disavowing thasa assantiaily offansiva notions of nuclaar 
strategy, the saaa Isvastia article practically endorsed 
a strategic concept which has prevailed over Western 
strategic thinking for decades:
. . . Soviet military doctrine— unlike its 
American counterpart••has always been based, 
and is still based, on the principle of 
retaliatory— i.a. defensive actions.*6
Soviet strategic doctrine has since its birth 
regarded itself as purely defensive in nature. However, 
the emphasis of "retaliatory" actions is significant. 
Throughout the development of strategic doctrine in the 
U.S-S.R., political and military leaders alike have referred 
to policies of retaliation, or second strike (AO) capa­
bilities, as a facet of a doctrine including an entire 
range of tenets as well. However, strategic policy in 
the 1980's, as this statement clearly demonstrates, seems 
to have been significantly transformed. A policy of re­
taliation is now described not simply as a corollary of a 
warfighting doctrine, but rather as the basis of Soviet 
strategic policy. Before examining possible motivation 
for the preceding modifications in doctrine and policy, 
an additional development will be presented and discussed.
Perhaps the most fundamental component of Soviet 
strategic doctrine has been the axiom of a Soviet victory 
should a nuclear war precipitate, indeed, the inevita­
bility of a socialist victory has enjoyed prominence in
military affairs .ince tha Soviet victory in the Qraat 
Patriotic War and tha emergence of Stalin's POP's.
Soviet rhatorie concarning victory in a nuclaar war, how­
ever, has bean substantially curtailed, especially in 
statements by tha political leadership. At tha 26th party 
congress in 1981, former Soviat leader Leonid Breshnev 
addressed this issue»
. . .  to attempt to be victorious over 
another in the nuclear arms face, to 
calculate victory in a nuclear war—  
this is dangerous madness I 47
These statements were echoed a year later by the present 
Soviet leader Yuri Andropov, in an ideological commentary 
stressing the necessity of adhering to the principle of 
Marxism-Leninisoj
Today, when the question of war and 
peace has become a question of life or 
death for whole peoples and for human 
civilisation in general, these Leninist 48 
ideas have become more urgent than ever.
It is essential to recognise that Andropov is 
arguing that a relationship characterised by mutual de­
struction exists between the superpowers. This is the very 
same view that, in the earlier stages of doctrinal develop­
ment, might have earned political demise for an individual 
espousing it. Halenkov's dismissal is ample evidence, 
lie supported defense policies based on the impossibility 
of a nuclear victory, and the military under Znukov opposed
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this. Support was given to Khrushchev at Malan'kov foil. 
Yat why doas tha Soviat laadarship of today apparantly 
endorse auch a view? what has changed in tha strategic 
relationship which might faoilitata auch a shift? Claarly 
tha contaxt in which Malan'kov statad his viawa is not
tha saaa aa tha contaxt surrounding Andropov's atataaant. 
Why ara thasa racant statamants amanating from tha U.S.S.R. 
conaidarad by tha Soviat leader^ to ba raora appropriata? 
To axplain thasa racant develop and provida responses 
to tha quastions posad, our attantion must ba diractad 
to tha concept of ralativa strategic parity and its impact 
on Soviat dootrina and policias. Notions of "parity," 
"stability,” and "balanca" have all become central thamas 
of Soviat policy discussions concerning relations with 
tha United States. Thasa ideas have, in addition, all
bean linked to discussions concerning tha negative impact 
of offensive strategies such as pre-emption and superiority 
on strategic stability and balanca.
The ara of U.S. strategic superiority is at an 
and. Tha Soviat strategic build-up of tha 1960's and 
1970's has resulted in ralativa strategic parity between
tha superpowers, and the political ramifications of this 
development are vast. During the period of American
strategic superiority, the U.S. edge in weapons was trans­
lated into political influence (compellance) on several 
occasions. The lerlin and Cuban crises are two examples. 
As Jonathon Lockwood has pointed out, the period of
American superiority lift a lasting impression on tha 
Soviets. They hava racognisad tha political benefits 
which accompany atratagie atrangth. Soviat strategic 
capabilitiaa hava grown substantially, as has tha Soviat 
ability to utilisa thair capability politically. With 
tha advant of parity, tha Soviat ability to utilisa its 
own atratagic power as a back-up to foreign policy ini­
tiatives and challenges haa increased. Of course, thay 
do not hava all or tha "elbow room" enjoyed by tha United 
States in tha 1950's and early 1960's. However, relative 
strategic parity has enabled tha Soviets to operate in 
a conventional mode, below the nuclear threshold, confidant 
that tha U.S. will not intarfara to tha point of risking 
escalation. Soviat strategic thinking seams to have under­
gone a shift. Classic Soviat warfighting doctrine has 
long considered nuclear weapons as instruments of war in 
tha operative sense. Being willing to consider them in 
this manner has in a large measure contributed to the 
Soviet deterrent posture as a whole. However, the Soviet 
leadership seems to have genuinely recognised tha notion 
of nuclear weapons more as political tools of "fear" or 
"eompallance" than practical instruments of war designed 
to achieve military objectives. A commentary in the 
authoritative journal Kommunlst illustrates this points
Power based on nuclear weapons has begun 
to take on greater political functions, 
whereas its potential for direct application 
has been relatively reduced.49
Soviet strategic thinkin? has embraced a notion which it 
fundamental to tho western conception of deterrence, namely, 
that nuclear weapons are weapons with substantial political 
utility, but little practical military utility. This is 
a significant development in Soviet thought, for it is 
alien to the typical Soviet strategic mindset which dominated 
strategic thinking for several decades. Raymond L. Garthoff 
discusses this Soviet recognition of the political utility 
of strategic posture in Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Ace:
While the optimum Soviet aim of the annihilation 
of the major center of hostile power would be 
deterred and frustrated (by U.S. Deterrent forces), 
the sub-optimum aim of improving the Soviet 
power position in peripheral areas would be 
greatly enhanoed by the neutralisation of the 
enemy power center.*0
Oarthoff's early refereenes to this aspect of Soviet 
thought (this book was finished in 1958) have since been 
proven by the development of Soviet conventional capabili­
ties, and the incorporation of their use and application 
into Soviet doctrine. Zn 1971 at the 24th Perth Congress, 
Breshnev referred to the necessity of Soviet support !or 
national liberation movements.51 Several years later, 
in 1974, then Minister of Defense Grechko elaborated on 
the new facet of Soviet policy:
The external function of the Soviet state 
and its armed forces and of the other socialist 
countries and their armies has now been en­
riched with new content . . . in its foreign 
policy aotlvity the Soviet state actively 
purposeduily opposes the export of counter-
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revolution end the policy of oppression, 
supports the national liberation stru^le, 
and resolutely resists imperialistic 
aggression in whatever distant region of 
our planet it nay appear.92
The incorporation of power projection into officially 
endorsed Soviet doctrine is illustrated by continuing 
Soviet naval developsient. A policy of force projection 
would be impossible without the necessary capabilities. 
Soviet decisions to embark on the development of a "blue 
water navy" and long-range airlift capabilities must also 
have been the result of an altered perception of the 
political environment, and whether or not such an environ­
ment would be receptive to Soviet foreign policy initiatives 
based on conventional military might.
Essential to this argumont is the nature of the 
political environment, lasically we are considering the 
international distribution of strategic power (predominantly 
the U.S. and U.S.S.R.), and how this strategic power 
influences the Soviet assessawit of its own opportunities 
in peripheral areas. Beoause of the importance in calcu­
lating possible escalation scenarios when an initiative 
is made in areas where the U.S.S.R. may receive a challenge 
from the D.S., military strength on the strategic level 
plays a fundamental role in a nation's decision to operate 
conventionally in an area under dispute. Soviet attain­
ment of relative parity with the U.S. has given the Soviets 
a great deal more confidence in their own ability to support
foreign policy go*la with conventional military might.
With Soviet achievement of a nuclaar capability 
ooaptriblt to that of the Unitad State*, notions of 
balance and stability have become key elements of Soviet 
strategic thinking. The Soviets have recognised nuclear 
weapons as instruments of political influence; reinforcing 
and stressing the balance of this political capital has 
apparently become a primary policy objective. According 
to Minister of Defense Ustinov, "the Soviet Union will
52not allow the existing balance of forces to be upset . . . • 
Recognition of the existence of a balance on the strategic 
level is a relatively new aspect of Soviet strategic thinking, 
and implies much more than a mere endorsement of existing 
society in numbers. This recognition is also accompanied 
by an offensively oriented foreign policy in areas whamm 
superpower interests may be eonflietual.
Declarations by the political as well as military 
leadership which apparently disavow traditional warfighting 
doctrinal tenets does not necessarily imply that these 
tenets no longer apply to official strategic policy. Pre­
emption must continue to be an element of Soviet strategic 
policy, for their hard target counterforce capability in 
the 1910's is acknowledged by a variety of analysts.
Soviet war survival and damage limitation strategies 
continue to play a large role in overall Soviet defames 
policies. Sowever, reluctance on the part of the Soviet
. - v - * ; ,  ■ - v .  ' fT. •' V, ■
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leadership to publicise doctrinal warfighting tenets, 
even to the point of denying their existence, probably 
emanates from an increased awareness of the advantages 
of cooperation with the Nest. Policies towards political 
detente under the Brezhnev leadership underscore Soviet 
desire to reduce tension with the United States. The 
abrasive, confrontational rhetoric which characterized 
doctrinal pronouncements in the 1950's and 1960's has 
disappeared. Zn its place are pronouncements stressing 
cooperation and the necessity of maintaining a balance 
of forces.
s
Afterword
Soviet strategic doctrine of the 1980'• is a 
product of decades of development. Numerous influences 
have shaped its evolution. A pervasive ideological in­
fluence has manifested itself in the doctrinal guarantee 
of a socialist victory should nuclear war occur. The 
ideology of the Soviet nation has also colored threat 
perception, and the manner in which American strategic 
and foreign policies are interpreted. The nation's 
historical experience in the sphere of relations with 
neighboring peoples is one characterized by foreign 
intervention and domination. In times of peace Tsarist 
Russia and the Soviet Union have maintained a strong 
defense coupled with a relatively aggressive foreign 
policy. A Soviet poaoetime military build-up, then, is 
not without precedent. Another influence on Soviet 
doctrine is clearly the dominance of the Soviet military 
in policy discussions over strategic issues. Traditional 
military values dominate the bulk of Soviet strategic 
thought. Many western strategic notions rub against the 
grain of these values; Soviet suspicion of the actual 
credibility of an Assured Destruction doctrine illustrates 
this point. This analysis has also demonstrated, however, 
that such western notions of Assured Destruction and the 
msintenanee of an adequate second-strike capability do occupy
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places in Soviet strategic doctrine, but they are not 
central doctrinal tenets, and serve to reinforce a war­
fighting doctrine.
Turning to doctrinal content, this analysis reveals 
the warfighting strategies which comprise it. The im­
portance of surprise and the initial period of a future 
war have facilitated Soviet concentration on the develop- 
aent of pre-emptive capabilities. Stress on damage limi­
tation and war survival policies are not only prerequisites 
for a nuclear victory, tut also function to enhance the 
credibility of the Soviet strategic threat. Yet such a 
doctrinal orientation by no swans implies aggressiveness 
in terms of advocating that a nuclear war should be fought. 
A warfighting doctrine must not be perceived as a doctrine 
which somehow advocates the initiation of a nuclear war.
The primary objective of Soviet strategic policies is 
deterrence. Strategic preconceptions on the part of many 
Western observers have handicapped an objective analysis 
of Soviet strategic doctrine. Damage limitation policies 
and counterforce strategies are not only destabilizing, 
but aggressive,according to orthodox Assured Destructive 
theory. Yet these strategies are fundamental to a war­
fighting doctrine. Soviet interpretations of the value 
of various nuclear strategies are decidedly alien to most 
Western views. For the Soviets, adequate war survival 
capabilities and an effective counterforce ability serve 
only to enhance the ability of the Soviet Armed Forces
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to detar aggression. For a nation to threaten war, it 
must logically be prepared to wage one.
In spite of the profound differences between 
Soviet and American strategic doctrines, both sides are 
deterred from attacking one another. A relationship based 
upon mutual deterrence exists. Each superpower has simply 
reacted differently to a common problem, and the means 
of achieving a deterrent capability are different for each 
"’nation. But the ends are the same. Understanding the 
ultimate goal of Soviet strategic doctrine requires an 
objective examination of its tenets and their deterrent 
value, not one shrouded by strict Western notions of what 
ia and isn't a policy of deterrence.
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